University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1954

The sources of jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal
Albert F. Barbieri
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Barbieri, Albert F., "The sources of jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal" (1954). Graduate
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8642.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8642

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

THE 3CUaCC3 OF JURISDICTION OF TES
IGrSRNATXÜNAL KILITAXT TOiSUKAL
by
Albert S&rbierl
B.A. Kontana State University, 1952
Presented in partial Fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

KONTANA STATS UNIV&KSITT
1954
Approved by:

C h a irfe ^ » ü o a rÿ ïo f ix ÿ ÿ .n e r s
B

y/Dean, Graduate School
—

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: EP39443

All rights reserved
INFO RM ATIO N TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction Is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, If material had to be removed,
a note will Indicate the deletion.

UMT
OwMftation PkiblMhina

UMI EP39443
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright In the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work Is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

uesf
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Elsenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1 3 4 6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE Of CCÜTEKT3
fag#
CRAfTSa I.

CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER III.

APPENDIX.

BIRTH Of AS ISTEESATIOBAL
MILITARI TRIBUSAL
........

1

STATUS Of OERKASI AT THE
TERMINATION Of WORLD WAR II ...

))

INTERPRETATION Of THE JURISDICTION Of THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARI TRIBUNAL ........

64

CHARTER Of T8S INTERNATIONAL
MILITARI TRIBUNAL..........

64

-11-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CBAPISa I
BIRTH OF AH IWTERHATtGHAL KiUTART TRIBUNAL
At « direct rttult of mto*8 atttapt to govern
hiattlf in the international eoDununit/, and hit
determination to puniah thoae who offended internation
al legal and ethical atandardt, an inatrument «rat
created» in the year 1945» to controveraial in nature
at to become a major concern of international juriste•
This instrument was the Nuremberg Tribunal constituted
for the express purpose of prosecuting European Axis
major war criminals whose crimes had no particular
geographical location.

The purpose of this study is to

examine the legal foundations of the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal.
History reveals the existence of a body of laws»
boro out of custom and convention, owing their existence
and growth to a desire to ameliorate conditions in the
conduct of warfare.

Establishment of violations of

these laws has ancient precedent, and war crimes trials
have been conducted in previous centuries.

But these

may not be relied upon as setting exact precedents for
the Nuremberg Court, for they were not war crimes trials
in the international sense embraced by the Tribunal at
Nuremberg.

The trial of Sir Peter of Hagenback in 1474
- 1-
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-2.
appear# to b* the first war crime trial on an inter
national level*

During the proceeding*, Sir Peter,

governor of Brelsach under Charles of Burguoda/, was
charged with having trespassed all bounds of decency
and humanity in his treatment of the people under his
rule*

in alliance of independent cities and states

captured Peter of Hagenb&ch and brought him before a
tribunal consisting of judge* from the various states
and cities forming the alliance*

He was convicted and

sentenced to^death for having disregarded the laws of
Cod and man*

This trial was carried on in accordance

with judicial standards and may be considered as a
forerunner of the Nuremberg trial*
The termination of World War I witnessed a formal
attempt to create an international war crimes tribunal
to punish enemy persons accused of having committed
acts in violation of the laws and customs of warfare*
An Allied commission was formed to inquire into and
report upon violations of international law chargeable
to Germany and her allies*

It came to naught*

As

the American Professor Qlueck remarks, ** * , the
malefactors not only went unwhipped of justice but
were vociferously championed by strong elements of

I

Georg Schwarsenberger, International taw. 30$
(2nd Ed* 1950).
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•3-

2

SngXlab and A*#fic*a publie opinion."

Kotwith*

atanding tha fact that moat of the aceuaad want unpuniahad, it ia imparativa that tha Coamiaaion*a
daXibarationa and racoanandationa ba axamlnad aa a
point of dapartura for aimilar davalopæanta after tha
Saoibd torld War.
Tha Preliminary Paaca Conference at tha plenary
aaaaion of January 25» 1919» decided to create a
eoamiaaion to inquire into tha raaponaibilitiaa for tha
war.

Tha Commiaaion compriaad fifteen mambara, two to

ba named by each of tha Great Powara (United Stataa,
Great Britain, Franca» Italy and Japan), and five to ba
elected from among tha Powara with apacial intareata.
Tha Commiaaion waa to inquire into and report upon the
following pointai
1.

Tha raaponaibility of tha author# of tha war.

2. Tha facta aa to braacbaa of tha law# and
euatoma of war committed by tha forcaa of
tha German Empire, and their Alliaa, on
land, on tea, and in tha air during the
present war.
3. Tha degree of responsibility for those
offence# attaching to particular member#
of the enemy forces, including members
of tha General Staff, and other indivi
duals, however, highly placed.

1-----

Sheldon Qlueck, Way Criminal#. 123 (1944).
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t.

Tht constitution and procedure of # tribunal
appropriate for the trial of these offence#.

5.

Any other matter# cognate or ancillary to the
above which may arise in the course of the
inquiry» and which the Commiaaion finds it
useful.and relevant to take into conaide*
ation.J

The Commission presented its carefully prepared opinions
to the Preliminary Peace Conference.

On the question of

the German responsibility for the war, the Commission
considered these acts to be of such gravity that they
should be formally condemned by the Conference;

how

ever, the acts which brought about the war should not
be charged against their authors or subjected to a
4
Tribunal.
I

Regarding breaches of the laws and customs of war
and of humanity, the Commission members recognised that
international law permits a belligerent to prosecute
those accused of committing offences against the laws
and customs

of war, once the accused are within its

power, and it may for that purpose set up its own
courts and procedure.

—

j—

However, four categories of

,
—

**Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors
of the t’ar and on Enforcement of Penalties.* 14 Americftei^A^^
L m 95 ( m o ) , hereafter

.

120
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•5*
charge»

to th« ##mb#ro to demand proceeding*

In an international tribunal.
(a)

Against persona belonging to enemy
countries who have committed outrage*
against a number of civilians and
soldiers of several Allied nations, such
as outrage* committed in prison camp*
where prisoner* of war of several na
tions were congregated or the crime of
forced labor in mines where prisoners
of more than one nationality were
forced to work;

(b)

Against persons of authority, belonging
to enemy countries, whose orders were
executed not only in one area or on
one battle front, but whose orders
affected the conduct of operation* against
several of the Allied Armies;

(e)

Against all authorities, civil or military,
belonging to enemy countries, however high
their position m f have been, without
distinction of rank, including the head*
of states who ordered, or, with knowledge
thereof and with power to intervene,
abstained from preventing or taking
measure* to prevent, putting an end to or
repressing, violations of the law* or
customs of war;

(d)

Against such other persons belonging to
enemy countries as, having regard to the
character of the offence or the law of
any belligerent country, it may be con
sidered advisable not to proceed before
a court other than the high tribunal
hereafter referred to.)

The Commission proposed that the United State#,
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan each choose three

i W . , 120W21.
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member# to tit on this Hlgb Tribunal» ani that Belgium»
Poland» Ceechoalovakia» Greece» Roumanie» Serbia and
Portugal each eelect one member for the Tribunal.

The

law to be applied b/ thia Tribunal waa to embrace
principles of international law founded on the laws of
humanity and established usages of civilised nations.
If an accused person was found guilty by the Tribunal»
the High Tribunal was to have the power to sentence
him to such punishment as mi^t be imposed for such an
offence by any court in any country represented on the
6
Tribunal or in the country of the convicted person.
Significantly the Commission believed that those
responsible for violating the peace» however grave their
acts» should not be subjected to a tribunal becauset
• • • by reason of the purely optional character
of the institutions at The Hague for the main
tenance of peace • • • a war of aggression may
not be considered as an act directly contrary
to positive law, or one which can be successfully
brought before a tribunal such as the Commission
is authorised to consider under its terms of
reference. Further» any inquiry into the author
ship of the war muet» to be exhaustive» extend
over events that have happened during many years
in different European countries, and must raise
many difficult and complex problems which might
be more fitly investigated by historians and
statesmen than by a tribunal appropriate to the
trial of offenders against the laws and customs
of war.7

122.
118.119.
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•7Thtiti According to the Gommleeloo, the Authors of the
wsr, notebly the ex-Kslser, should not be brought
before

a

tribunal. however# the Commission, debating

the charge of violations of the ^aws of war, was of
the opinion that an international tribunal could try
such offenders, regardless of their position in the
German government.
These recommendations of the Commission were not
adopted.

The American members of the Commission refused

assent to the creation of an international criminal court
for the trial of individuals, on the ground that precedent was lacking in the practice of nations.
believed

They

. . that an act could not be a crime in the

legal sense of the word, unless it were made so by law,
and that the commission of an act declared to be crime
by law could not be punished unless the law prescribed
the penalty to be inflicted.*

The American members

declared that they knew of no international statute or
convention making a violation of the laws and customs of
war an international crime, establishing a punishment for
it or stating the court which had jurisdiction over the
offense.

The Americans "felt that the difficulty • • •

was not insurmountable, inasmuch as the various states
have declared certain acts violating the laws and customs

IW.
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of war to bo crlaoa» affixing puniabmont for thoir
oommlgaioQ# and providing military courts or commiaaion*
within the respective state# possessing jurisdiction
9
over such offence."
further, the Ünited States members
opposed the doctrine of negative criminality which placed
a criminal charge against individuals who failed to pre
vent violations of the laws of war.
The Japanese delegates to U%e Commission raised the
same basic question whether the law of nations recognised
a penal law applicable to those who are guilty.
seemed vital to them to

It also

. , consider the consequences

which would be created in the history of international
law by the prosecution for breaches of the laws and
customs of war of enemy heads of states before a tribunal

10
constituted by the opposite party."
Thus the Allies, instead of accepting in full tbs
recommendations of the Commission, inserted in the Treaty
of Versailles certain "punitive Articles."

By Article

22$ the German government recognised the ri^t of tbs
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military
tribunals persona accused of having committed acts in
violation of the laws and customs of war.

By the same

Article, the German government was to hand over to one or
9

10

147.

Ibid.. 152.
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-9«XI of th« Allied end A«soelated Power# «11 persona so
«eeusedi specified by name «nd rank, office or employ
ment which they held under Oermsn authorities.

The

guilty were to be sentenced to punishments prescribed
by lew.

Article 229 provided for the trial of the

accused in military tribunals of the power against whose
nationals the alleged crimes were committed.

By Article

230 the German government undertook to furnish «11
documents and information which might be considered
necessary for such proceedings.
Pursuant to Article 228, lists of accused persons
were compiled by the principal Allied nations and pre
sented to the German government on February 3, 1920.
Opon receipt of more than nine hundred names, the German
government, though solemnly bound to respect the Peace
Treaty, refused to surrender its war cris&inals.

Approxi

mately two weeks before presentation of the list of
accused to Germany, the German governaent had proposed
a compromise by which Germany would assume responsibility
to prosecute the war criminals.

The Allies, sensing the

growing opposition to trials of German war criminals in
Allied military courts, finally accepted the German
suggestion, with the reservation that, if they were not
satisfied with the conduct of the German court prosecuting
the war criminals, the Allies would again exercise the
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*10.
right to try the «oeusod la their own military trihuaale*
la the place of the original list cootalning the
Blue hundred names presented to Germany, February 3,

1920, the Allies substituted aa abridged list to the
German Supreme Court at ielpslg containing only forty
five names of accused.

Qlueck notess

But having so easily obtained a major concession
from the Allies, the Germans mere not ready for
trial even after receiving this abridged list.
They informed the Allies that difficulties were
being experienced in obtaining evidence against
the accused, because much of the necessary proof
was in possession of the Allied Governments*
The Allies then arranged to assemble statement#
of the proof against persons on the abridged
list and transmit them to the . . . public prosecutor
in lelpflg. They prepared the evidence with com
mendable care. Preliminary examinations were made
in France and Belgium) depositions were taken la
London) witbnesses were collected from across the
seas and brought to Lelptig.ll
From the very beginning, however, the Lelptig Tribunal
bratenly flouted the seriousness of the task*

Only

twelve of the forty five persons accused of war crimes
were actually tried b/ the Leipzig Court and but six
were convicted;

their sentences ranged from six months

to four years imprisonment.

The Allies were distressed,

and the French and Belgians particularly were indignant
over the Leipzig proceedings,

A Commission of Allied

11
Qlueck, 422* 111## 27-2$.
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-11Juriati Ma» aet up in 1922, to inquira into tha conduct
of tha Laipaig tflala.

In ganaral, tha Coaadttaa waa

diaaatiafiad with tha procaadinga of that Court*

Tha

mambara of tha Gomaittaa conclodad that it waa uaalaaa
to allow tha Carman court to continua*

Aa a rasult,

tbaf raconmandad to tha Suprama Council of Xhû Allied
and Aaaociatad Powara that no new oaaea ba aant to
taipaig and that tha Carman government ba compelled to
turn over aecuaad paraona for proaecution by tha Allies
in pursuance of Article 228.

"Thia," according to Oluak,

"only resulted in great indignation in Germany • * * •
Chauvinistic groups organised truculent protest meetings
throughout Germany, at which high-ranking officers re
minded the world that 250,000 national soldiers and tha
police of tha Eaichswehr are in alliance to prevent tha
12
handing over of Germans to tha justice of the Entente•*
In view of tha half-hearted attempts at justice by
tha Court and tha apathy evident in soma Allied circles,
notably American and British, tha German republic was
able to affect an almost total acquittal for their war
criminals.

But despite dissatisfaction and tha failure

to establish strong precedents, there can ba little
doubt that tha intentions and opinions of tha Allied
12
m a . , }2.
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Commimm&oa er#*t#d # p*tt*ra which became m comer#too#
la the structure of the more recent tribunal.
The Interim period between two major world con*
filets la this century might perhaps have given birth to
a body, eucb as an International tribunal, powerful
enough to cope with future war criminals and war crimes
trials.

But this did not occur.

True enough, a World

Court existed, but it lacked jurisdiction to try
criminal charges or to punish individual offenders.
Moreover, no international code of criminal law was
created during this period.

Neither the Geneva Protocol

of 1924 nor the Paris Pact of 192S, though designed to
promote international conciliation, developed a code of
international criminal law or an international tribunal.
Thus, as another war approached, the world still
lacked some supra-national organ established for the
punishment of persons violating principles in the law of
nations.

However, the incredible mass atrocities, havoc

and destruction, and treaty violations which accompanied
the more recent European holocaust aroused a great demand
for punishment of those responsible for it. Many official
protests were issued by the nations occupied by Germany
for crimes committed by Germans on their soil.

Crimea

13
See David 8. Killer, The Geneva Protocol. (1925);
James T. Oerould, The fact of Paris, (1929).
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-13committed by the German# in Poland and CteehoslOTtkia
were condoned by the British» French, Polish and
Csechoslovak government# In 1940#

A# General Taylor,

Chief of Counsel for Prosecution in the Nuremberg Tri
bunal, notes, "President Franklin 0. Roosevelt publicly
condemned the German practice of executing scores of
innocent hostages in October 1941, and the British Govern
ment indorsed President Roosevelt*# views in a declaration
14
by Mr# Churchill#*
But it was not until 1942 that a
systematic program was developed to handle the problem
of enemy war criminals;

A London conference of resent15
ative# from nine European countries
culminated la the

14
Telford Taylor, "Nuremberg Trials," 450 Inter*
national Conciliation 244 (April 1949)#
Belgium, Cseehoslovakie, Free French National
Committee, Greece, Norway, Poland, Tugoslavia, Luxenbourg, and The Netherlands.
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16
dt« J#*## Declaration of January 13» 1942,

It ia worth

IST~~
The text, me reported in The ??e» York Tiaeg, p* 6,
eol. 1, Jan. 14, 1942s
Whereas Germany since the beginning of the present
conflict, which arose out of her policy of aggres
sion, has instituted in occupied countries a
regime of terror characterised in particular by
imprisonments, mass expulsions, execution of
hostages, and massacres • • •
,
. , And whereas, international solidarity is
necessary in order to avoid repression of these
acts of violence simply by acts of vengeance on
the part of the general public and in order to
satisfy the sense of justice of the civilised world}
Recalling that international law and, in particular.
The Bague in 1907 regarding laws and customs of
land warfare do not permit belligerents in occupied
countires to perpetrate acts of violence against
civilians, to bring into disrepute laws in force
,
/ or to overthrow national .institutions}
The undersigned representatives of the Government
of Belgium, the Government of Ciecho-Slovakia,
the Free French Rational Committee, the Government
of Greece, the Govemoent of Korway, the Government
of Poland, the Government of Luxemburg, the Govern
ment of the Retherlands, and the Government of
• Yugoslaviat ■
1. Affirm that acts of violence thus perpetrated
against civilian populations are at variance with
accepted ideas concerning sets of war and political
offenses as these are understood by civilised nations;
2# Take note of the declaration made in this respect
on October 25, 1941, by the President of the United
States of America and the British Prime Minister;
'3. Place among their principal war aims punishment
through the channel of organised justice of those
guilty and responsible for these crimes whether they
have ordered them, perpetrated them or in any way
participated in them;
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-15Botic# that the elgnetoriée were governmente in exile;
none of the major etatee were parties*

This document

was a declaration of intention to punish those guilt/
of war crimes, at the termination of hostilities*

The

Declaration, made public to the world, provoked an
enormous amount of criticism*

While some believed that

summary punishment of the guilty would be the safest
and quickest method of attaining the goal, others saw
in the trials Allied desires for vengeance and fearful
17
consequences in future history*
One of the principal aims of Allied statesmen waa
to try the offenders through the channels of organised
justice, with the view that all the nations and their
leaders would not soon forget these documented proceedings*

'4* Determine in the spirit of international
solidarity to see to it that those guilty and
responsible, whatever their nationality, are
sought for, handed over to justice and judged;
that sentences pronounced are carried out*
17
,
See Montgomery Belgion, Victors* Justice. (1949);
Quincy Wriaht, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 41
A*J*I*L. 3d (1947).
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-16Koreover, ther« if Ilttlf doubt that thia talk of
puniahmeat waa planned by the Allies in order to
encourage reaiatance to the German# and to demoralise
them.

It might be added howeTer, that the German leader#»

sensing forthooaing puniahmeot» appear to have spurred
German resistance to the bitter end.
As months passed, the determination of the Allies
to punish criminals of tha European Isis increased. On
à
4
many occasions. Allied statesmen issued warning that
wrongs done would not go unpunished.

Early in 1942, the

American Secretary of State declaredt
be are confident that before the end of another
year the instigators of this war will have been
given to understand how seriously they have understiaated the deteimination and the ability for
effective action of the peace-loving nations and
will have learned that in an aroused world aggressors
can no longer escape the consequences of sets result
ing in human suffering and destruction.Id
In May, 1942, the United States Assistant Secretary of
State, Mr, Berle, announced;

le
Department of State Bulletin 1761, gfflflmtUlS.tiDfla
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-17Th# individual Castapo agents, Bleek-Troopers,
and others guilty of cruelty, robbery end
oppression of civilians must be held to
secouât* The names of many of these are already
known to the United Kations* % e y will learn
that none can break tha laws of civilisation
with Impunity,19
On October 7, 1942, the President of the United States
isade his views public to the world:
On August 21 I said that this government was
constantly receiving information concerning
the barbstic crimes being committed by the
enemy against civilian populations in occupied
countries, particularly on the continent of
Europe, 1 said it was the purpose of this
government, as I knew it to be the purpose of
the other United Nations, to see that when
victory is won the perpetrators of these crimes
shall answer for them before courts of law.
I BOW declare it to be the intention of this
government that the successful close of the
war shall include provisions for the surrender
to the United Nations of war criminals, it is
our intention that just and sure punishment shall
be meted out to the ring-leaders responsible
for the organised murder of thousands of
innocent persons and the commission of atro
cities which have violated every tenet of
Christian faith*20
A few days later the United States and British
governments announced their desire to join with other

19
Dept, of State Bull. 1742. Cpmemor&tion ^
Hisiua

2Î

^
*
Dept* of State Bull* 1824,
Commission Jfea InvestWte War Crimes. 797 IOctober 10,
1942 J*
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•Id»
Allied iMitloQS to establish a *bnlt«d hâtions Commission
for the Investigation of War Crimes»*

Seventeen nations

joined In eresting the Commission which met for the
21
first time In October 1943»
Russie desired to parti
cipate, and urged that her sixteen Soviet Republics be
represented Independently»

This demand was opposed by

the United States and Great Britain, and as a result
the Soviet Union refused to participate»

The Commission

for the Investigation of War Crimes gathered and ini

•

dexed charges submitted by member nations, and assembled
lists of war crime suspects, but did not make investi
gations or prepare prosecutions*
These Allied warnings and preparations of punishment
did not deter the haeis, who continued their barbarous
experiments at Dachau and Buchenwald»

Other tldlees

sprang up in various German occupied areas, notably the
Greek village of Olstomo, and the unwarranted shooting
of hostages, prisoners of war and civilians was not
halted»

21
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Csechoalov«kia,
France, Greece, India,.Luxemburg, the hetherlands, hew
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Couth Africa, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia»
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-19»

Allied det#mination to punish the eneoy grew
la strength with the Moscow Conference*

la # *0eela-

ration on German Atrocities," of October 50, 1945, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet
Union jointly declaredt
At the time of the granting of any armistice
to any government which may be set up In
Germany, those German officers and men and
members of the Katl party who have been
responsible for, or have taken a consenting
part in the above atrocities, massacres and
executions, will be sent back to the countries
in which their abominable deeds were done In
order that they may be judged and punished
according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of the free govertusents which
will be created therein. . * * The above
declaration is without prejudice to the
case of the major criminals, whose offences
have no particular geographical locali*a&ion
and who will be punished by the joint
decision of the Goveraments of the Allies.**
A further and decisive step In the formulation of
an International tribunal was taken only after victory
in Surope.

Pursuant to the Moscow Declaration, the

United Kingdom, the United States, the French Republic,
and the Soviet Union met at London, August 0, 1945,
and signed an agreement of the establishment of an

^ ----"Tripartite Conference In Moscow," 50
(Supp) 7-0 (1944).
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•20international military tribunal*

Tha London Agreement

eryatalllsed the porpoae of the signatory national
Article 1
There «ball be established after consultation
with the Control Council for Germany an Inter
national Military Tribunal for the trial of
war criminals whose offences have no parti
cular geographical location whether they be
accused Individually or In their capacity
as members of organisations or groups or In
both capacities.
Article 2
The constitution, jurisdiction and functions
of the International Military Tribunal shall
be those set out in the Charter annexed to
this Agreement, which Charter shall form an
Intagral part of this Agreement,
Article 3
Each of the signatories shall take the
necessary steps to make available for the
Investigation of the charges and trial the
major war criminals detained by them who are
to be tried by the International Military
Tribunal, The signatories shall also use
their best endeavours to make available for
Investigation of the charges against and
the trial before the International Military
Tribunal such of the major war criminals as
are not In the territories of any of the
signatories.
Article 4
Nothing In this Agreement shall prejudice the
provisions established by the Moacow Declaration
concerning the return of war criminals to the
countries where they committed their crimes.
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-21Articl# 5
Any Govemmemt of th« Unltod Nation# may
adbar# to thia Agreement by notice given
through the diplomatic channel to the
Government of the United Kingdom, who
shall Inform the other signatory and
adhering Governments of each such adherence.
Article 6
Nothing In this Agreement shall prejudice
the jurisdiction or the powers of any
national or occupation court established or
to be established In any Allied territory
or In Germany for the trial of war criminals.
Article 7
This Agreement shall come Into force on
the day of signature and shall remain in force
for the period of one year and shell continue
thereafter, subject to the right of any sig
natory to give, through the diplomatic channel,
one month's notice of Intention to terminate It,
Such termination shall not prejudice any pro
ceedings already taken or any findings already
m&de in pursuance to this Agreement. 23
The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of
the International Military Tribunal are found in the
Charter drawn up expressly for the Tribunal and appended

2)
C&nfepengg m M l l m Z ÎElâlî»
8.
Department of atate Publication judO, international
Organisation and Conference Series II, European and
British Commonwealth 1, 420-421 (1949), hereafter cited
Bm a a ü m m . s..
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to tb# London Agreement#

According to the Cherter,

the International Military Tribunal would have the
power to try and punish major war criminals of the
European Amis#

The Charter specified that each of the

four original signatories would designate a member and
an alternate to the Tribunal#

The members of the Tri

bunal, before the beginning of trial, were to agree
among themselves upon the selection of a President
from their number,

fiegarding jurisdiction, signatories

declared in Charter Article 3, that "Neither the Tri
bunal, its members nor their alternates can be
challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or
24
their Counsel#”
The Tribunal was not to concern it
self with all individuals »Ao bad committed barbarities,
no matter how grave or repulsive, nor with traitors,
such as Laval, Quisling, or Lord "Haw Haw,” nor with
individuals committing crimes in localised areas of a
country formerly occupied by Germany, for such persons
would come under the jurisdiction of the national courts
where the sets were perpetrated#

the Tribunal would

prosecute only major war criminals of the European Axis,
whose offences, as stated at Moscow, "have no particular
24
International Conference S3l Kilitsry Trials. 422.
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•23(#ographlc#l loo&tlen»* #nd who*# crime# were part
of the Set! maeter plan of aggresalon#

A# Justice

Jackaon, Chief Counsel for Prosecution on behalf of
the United States, declaredt
Our case against the major defendants is
concerned with the Haei master plan, not
with individual barbarities and perversions
which occurred independently of any central
plan# The groundwork of our case must be
factually authentic and constitute a well
documented history of what we are convinced
was a grand, concerted pattern to commit
the aggressions and barbarities which have
shocked the world# 25
The Nuremberg Court was invested with power to try
and punish individuals guilty of having committed
the following crimest
Crimes Against the Peace; namely, planning,
preparation. Initiation or wedging of a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participating in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing;
War Crimea; namely, violations of the laws
or customs of war# Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, illtreatment or deportation to slave labor or
for any other purpose of civilian population
of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
Crimes Against Humanity; namely, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against
1 3 -------

International Confaranc* && Military IdSll. W.
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•24»
civilian population, befora or during th# war;
or paraaoutloaa on political, racial, or
rallgloua grounds In execution of or In
connection with any crime within the juris
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not In
violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated. 26
With regard to the official position of the defendants,
whether Reads of Stats or responsible officials In the
German government, the Tribunal was not to consider
them as outside Its jurisdiction, nor was their position
to be considered as mitigating the punishment they were
to receive.

Selthtr could the Tribunal free from punish

ment those defendants who acted pursuant to superior
orders, though this might be considered In mitigation
of punishment.

This was demonstrated In practice during

the Suremberg proceedings when the Tribunal stated that
"The principle of International law, which under certain
circumstances, protects the representatives of a State,
cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal
by International law.

The authors of these act# cannot

shelter themselves behind their official position In
order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceed27
logs.*
Again In the view of the Court, *That a soldier
26

27

m

M U U a f Z lH&la, 423.

United States Chief of Counsel for the Prose
cution of Axis Criminality, Kael Conspiracy and Aggressioni
Opinion and Judgment. 53 t i w i , hereafter cited uplnloa
âal jRtetai*
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ordered to kill or torture la YioXetioa of tb#
International law of war hao never been recognised me
a defense to such acts of brutality, though a# the
Charter here provides, the order aay be urged in mitiga
tion of the punishment.

The true test, which is found

in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations,
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral
2Ô
choice was In fact possible."
The determination of
criminality on the part of some group or organisation,
such as the Oestamo. also came within the realm of the
Tribunal.
An examination of the Charter, concerning fair
trial for the defendants, reveals the workable and
sensible procedure to be used by the Tribunal.

The Four

member nations each had relatively distinct and highly
developed judicial traditions.

For Instance, criminal

procedure in both the United States and Great Britain
allows a defendant to testify subject to cross examination.
This method Is quite unknown in the French and Russian
systems. However, the stipulation that a defendant may
give statements to a tribunal without taking an oath or
subjecting himself to a cross-examination is employed
by continental courts but is wholly alien to AngloAmerican practice.

Further, unlike Anglo-American

2d
Opinion and Judgment. )3-54.
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•2 6 -

judical practlc#, Soviet practice relies on the
diligence of the court rather than the efforts of
29
counsel to develop the facts In a case.
Sensing the
need to resolve these differences, the Four allies, after
much discussion were able to achieve an amalgamation of
the divergent practices.

Article 24 of the Charter re

conciled these divergent legal philosophies of the
member nations In a workable procedure which sought to
preserve the elements of reasonableness and fairness*
Article 24. The proceedings at the Trial
shall take the following course*
• • . • (g) The Prosecution and the Defense
shall interrogate and may cross-examine any
witness and any defendant who gives testimony.
, . . . (j) Sack defendant may make a state
ment to the Tribunal. 30
Article l6 of the Charter contained certain safeguards
of fairness In the hearings %
Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial
for the Defendants, the following procedure
shall be followed:

29
Taylor,
30
la U c ia ilfia a l

258-259.
m m i m a Ir iâ la » 427-

428.
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'

(a)

Th# Indictment shall l&clud# full
particulars specifying in detail
the charges against the Defendants.
A copy of the Indictment and of all
the documents lodged with the
Indictment, translated into a
language which he understands, shall
be furnished to the Defendant at a
reasonable time before the Trial.

(b)

During any preliminary examination
or trial of a Defendant he shall have
the right to give any explanation
relevant to the charges made against
him.

(c)

A preliminary examination of a
Defendant and his Trial shall be con
ducted in, or translated into, a
language which the Defendant understands.

(d)

A defendant shall have the right to
conduct his own defense before the Tri
bunal or to have the assistance of Counsel.

(e)

A defendant shall have the right through
himself or through his Counsel to present
evidence at the Trial in support of his
defense, and to cross-examine any witness
called by the froseeution. 31

Articles 18 through 21 of the Charter for the Inter
national military Tribunal stipulated that the Tribunal

3 1------ ,
Ibid.. 426.
32
Ibid.. 426,
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32

was not to b« bound by technical rules of evidence*
la paeslas sentence, the Tribunal was to state
reasons why it had found a defendant guilty or not

32
Ibid.. U27i
Article 18#
(a)
(b)

(c)

The Tribunal shall

Confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious
bearing of the issues raised by the charges,
take strict measures to prevent any action
which will cause unreason&ole delay, and
rule out irrelevant issues and statements
of any kind whatsoever,
deal summarily with any contumacy, impos
ing appropriate punishment, including ex
clusion of any Defendant or his Counsel
from some or all further proceedings, but
without prejudice to the determination of
the charges*

Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt
and apply to the greatest possible extent ex
peditious and non-technical procedure, and shall
admit any evidence which it deems to have
probative value*
Article 20* The Tribunal may require to be in
formed of the nature of any evidence before it
is offered so that it may rule upon the re
levance thereof*
Article 21* The Tribunal shall cot require
proof of facts of common Knowledge but shall
take judicial notice thereof* It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental
documents and reports of the United hâtions,
including the acts and documents of the com
mittees set up in the various allied for the
investigation of war crimes, and the records and
findings of military or other Tribunals of any of
the United Rations.
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guilty#

Each judgment would be final and not subject

to review.

On conviction# imposition upon a defendant

of the death penalty or any other punishment was iu
the hands of the Court#

Oentences were to be carried

out in accordance with the orders of the Control Council
for Germany, which had the power to reduce or otherwise
alter the sentences, but not to increase their severity.
If after the conviction of a defendant, the Control
Council should find new evidence upon vdiich a fresh
charge could be lodged against him, the Council was to
report the matter to the Prosecution#
Thus, the Allies surmounted most vexing problems
to create an intematio al leg&l tribunal for the trial
of major war criminals.

The trial opened on November

20, 1945* and was faced with the prosecution of twentytwo defendants and six organisations#

A day later,

November 21, 1945» Justice Jackaon arose to present the
opening statement in the case on behalf of the United
States government.

The American Justice conceded that

the Tribunal, while novel and experimental, was not the
product of abstract theorising#

It was rather the

result of a practical effort by four powerful nations
and numerous lesser powers to utilise international law
in cases where it had been violated.

The significance

of the Tribunal, for the United States representative.
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"30—
was that it would bring to justice those living
symbols of terrorisa, racial hatreds, violence, and
of arrogance and cruelty.

To have filtered in creat

ing such a court would have meant that civilization
was compromising with those evil persons who renew
their strength on the apathy and timidity of others.
Unfortunately, stated Jackson the nature
of these crimes is such that both prosecution
and judgment must be m d e b/ victor nations
over vanquished foes. The world-wide scope
of the aggressions carried out by these men
has left but few real neutrals. Either the
victors must judge the vanquished or we must
leave the defeated to judge themselves.
After the first World *ar, we learned the
futility of the latter course. The former
high station of these defendants, the
notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability
of their conduct to provoke retaliation make
it hard to distinguish between the demand
for a just and measured retribution, and the
unthinking cry for vengeance which arises
from the anguish of war. . . . %e must never
forget that the record on which we judge
these defendants today is the record on
which history will judge us tomorrow. 33
Sir Hartley Shawcroas, United Kingdom prosecutor
on the Nuremberg Tribunal saw the possibility of
summary punishment for the defendants, but only a tri
bunal could adjudge the guilt of those accused, according

33
Robert R. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi »-]
Original:. 7 (19161.
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to law as wall as on moral or athlcal bases,

kbile

natural justice demanded that the perpetrators of
war crimes be punished, it also demanded that no person
be punished unless a careful examination of the facts
demonstrated that he shared the guilt for what has
been done.

The British representative declared*

• « • the effects of this trial will reach out
far beyond the punishment of a score or so of
guilty sen. Issues are at stake far greater
than their fate, although upon their fate those
issues, in some measure depend. In the pages
of history it will count for nothing whether
this trial lasted for two months or for ten.
But it will count for much that by just and
patient examination the truth has been established
about deeds so terrible that their mark may never
be erased, and it will count for much that law
and justice have been vindicated in the end, 34
In bis closing argument, Deputy Chief Prosecutor
Dubost, for the French Republic, pointed out that the
Court received facts which were submitted with the
strictest objectivity, allowing no room for passion.
Further, the Tribunal bad excluded from Jbbate anything
that, in its view, appeared insufficiently demonstrated,
anything that might have been motivated by reason of
vengeance.

For the French prosecution, the important

34
United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution
of Axis Criminality, 1 M i l
àâ&Esaalaa,
(Supp A) 62 (1946), hereafter cited kari Conspiracy.
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element of the Nuremberg Trial was that of historical
truth,

future historians would have a documented

record of the political, diplomatic, and military events
during a most unfortunate period in history, and of the
way in which Allied nations punished the men who were
&uiity of many acts contrary to legal and moral codes.

35

tt« General Rudenko, representing the Soviet Union
as prosecutor remarked in his closing arguments
For the first time in the history of mankind,
criminals against humanity are being held
responsible for their crimes before an Inter
national Criminal Tribunal. . . . The present
trial is being conducted in such a manner
that the defendants who are accused of the
most heinous crimes, are given all the
possibilities for a defense, all the necessary
legal guarantees. In their own country, the
defendants who stood at the head to the
Government, destroyed all legal forms of
justice. . . . They themselves are being
tried by the International Court in accordance
with all legal guarantees and they are assured
of all their defense rights. 36

/
75
iUaoaalfâfix, 159.
3
Hati ConsDirscY. 199, 200.
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CHAPTER II
STATÜ3 OP G&aKANI AT THi TSB%i*ATlvN Of WC*lLO WAH II
Before we can discuss the sources of jurisdiction
of the International Military Tribunal, our attention
should be directed toward a problem of paramount importances
the statue of Germany at the end of World War II,

The

question, "who possessed sovereignty?" must be resolved
since it is closely connected with bases of jurisdiction
of the Tribunal.

It is relevant because Germany did not

consent to the establishment of a court for the trial of
her subjects and thus a fundamental problem of international
law, that of the necessity of consent, is raised,
Cn April 29, 1945, Lieutenant-General W, D, Morgan,
Chief of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters, received
the signature of two German plenipotentiaries, providing
for cessation of hostilities and unconditional surrender
of Kasi forces to the allied forces in Italy to be
effective Kay 2, 1945.

The instrument of surrender

stipulated that "It is independent of, without prejudice
to, and will be superseded by, any general instrument of
surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Mations
and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as
-33"
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•34**
1
a whol#.*
On

6 and 9, respectively, German representatives,

for the balance of the German forces, signed further un*
conditional surrender documents at Rheims and Berlin.
Complete cessation of hostilities had now been achieved.
It is important to note that these last two documents
of surrender had, like the first, stipulated that a
general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf
of the United Kations would follow and supersede them.
Twenty seven day# later these initial instruments
of surrender were supplanted by the promulgation of the
Declaration of Berlin, June 5, 1943.

According to this

document the victorious powers assumed supreme authority
over the German territory:
The German armed forces on land, at sea and
in the air have been completely defeated and
have surrendered unconditionally. . . . There
is no central Government or authority in
Germany capable of acoepting responsibility
for the maintenance of order, the administration
of the country and compliance with the require*
meats of the victorious Powers . . . . The
Government of the United Kingdom, the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, hereby assume
supreme authority with respect to Germany,
1----------

"Unconditional Surrender of German and Italian
Forces at Caaerta," 39
(Supp) 169 (1943).
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-35including all the power* possessed by the
German Coremment» the High Cozm&nd end
any state, municipal, or local government
or authority* The assumption, for the
purposes stated above, of the said
autî ority and powers does not effect the
annexation of Germany.2
This Declaration created unique and unprecedented
situation In Germany, and many theories have since
arisen as to the legal status of that country*

Occupied

Germany truly presents a legal dilemma, since it was
conquered and its government was destroyed, but it wae
not annexed*

To find an acceptable legal approach to

the status of Germany an inquiry

u*t be made into

the several divergent theories dealing with the matter.
Occupation
The long-recognised status of belligerent occupation
must be clearly distinguished from whatever form of
occupation existed in German territory after World War
IX*

Article A3 of The Regulations Reapectln? the Laws

#nd Customs jgX

^

tand annexed to the Hague Con-

2
"Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and
the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to
Germany," 39
(Supp) 171-172 (1945) emphasis
added*
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ventlon of 1907 declared;
The authority of the legitimate power
having paeeed into the h&nde of the occupant,
the latter shall take all step* in hie power
to re-establish and Insure, a* far a#
possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country*3
By belligerent occupation the legitimate government is
made incapable of exercising its authority and the
authority of the occupant power is substituted only
for the period of occupation*

But the occupant power

cannot assume soverignty over the occupied territory*
It must, as expressly stated in Article 43, respect
the laws in force in the country at time of occupation,
unless absolutely prevented*

Further, it must at some

time conclude a treaty of peace with the government
of the occupied territory under its domination*

The

international jurist, Hans Kelsen, declares that belli
gerent occupation "presupposes that a state of war still
exists in the relationship between the occupant state
and the state whose territory ia under belligerent
occupation*"

"Convention with Respect to Laws and Customs of
iar on Land," 1
(Supp) 148 (1907)*
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-37This condition Implies the continued existence
of the state whose territory is occupied and,
consequently, the continued existence of its
government recognized as the legitimate bearer
of the sovereignty of the occupied state, this
is the reason why it is generally assumed that
belligerent occupation does not confer upon
the occupant power sovereignty over the
occupied territory.4
If the state exercising belligerent occupation should
expel the legitimate government or the head of state,
some form of government must be allowed to continue
and be recognized as the legal one.

Further, the occupant

has no right to divide the country for political purposes.
For instance, the division of Belgium by Germany into
French and Flemish zones during World War X, and the
encouragement of Flemish nationalism has been considered
to be a violation of international law.

The conquering

power has no legal justification in setting up ^art of
the occupied territory as an independent state.

Prior

to the First World War, George Grafton Wilson stressed
the point that:

4
Hans Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany According
to the Declaration of Berlin,** 39
51Ô (194)j.
5
ibid.. 5ia.
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. . , military occupation (occuratio ballica).
, . , by tb« usage of nation» and the laws
of war» differs from» and falls short of.
the right of complete conquest (dobellatlo.
wltioa victoria) . * » . Military occupation
is an incident of war» and as such is not
political in its effects^ It does not
transfer sovereignty» hut giyes to the invading
force the right to exercise control for the
period of occupatioa.6
Discussing further the rights and limitations of belli
gerent occupation» Wilson statedt
Military occupation in the strict sense is a
term applicable only in time of war» and is
the effective holding by force of an enemy
territory. This would cease in fact when the
force is withdrawn» and would cease from a
legal point of view when b/ treaty of peace
the war is at an end, 7
According to Bershey» writing during the First *orld
d&rt
Belligerent or military occupation should also
be distinguished from conquest, ÎTie rights of
a military occupant» howevt^r absolute» are in
no wise those of a sovereign. They are merely
provisional and are based upon military necessity,
The occupant may not exact an oath of allegiance
and his status is not even that of a temporary
or substituted sovereign.8

6
George G, Wilson» International Law. 329-330 (1910),
HI.

£ySuÈ'lls!'A05‘‘u9i&)?^ lâSSSUêil s£
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•39O^gç-Upatio bolliea. being of an ftaaentialljr provisional
character, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over
the occupied territory, notwithstanding the fact U m t
the jââ lure sovereign, during the period of occupancy,
9
Is deprived of power to exercise Its rights as such.
Belligerent occupation, being provisional in character.
Is essentially precarious since It io subject to the
vicissitudes of war.

It presupposes that war goes on

in a factual sense;

that the occupied state can still

offer some resistance;

and that continuance of resistance

may result in changing the general situation.

After

World 'i;sr II, It was evident that belligerent occupation
in the tr&ditional sense could not cover the case of
Germany,

Thus, the American jurist Kunz writes; "how

ever, after the total defd&t of Nazi Germany, the
situation was essentially different since the occupation
had become firmly established;

any resistance, any

factual continuation of hostilities, any possibility
that the occupant might be driven out * . , all these

10
were out of the question,"

The law of belligerent

9
Charles Hyde, 3 International Lew. 1878 (3rd 2d.
1947).
10
Josef L, Kuos, "The Status of Occupied Germany Un
der International Law." 3 Western Political iuarterlv
556 (1950).
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•40oceupation is atlll^a valid concept for lunm# but he,
s$ do m n y others,

denies that it wos applicable to

Germany after her unconditional surrender in 1945.
"Any attempt to construe Uie present status of occupied
Germany as simple belligerent occupation must necessarily
fail in view of the unsurmountable legal obstacle
12
constituted by Article 4? of the H^gue rules."
The
American lawyer Friedman, analysing the legcl status of
Germany, admits that revolutionary changes in the social
structure of states and in the methods of modern war
fare have made the majority of the rules of warfare
obsolete.

"But even the most elastic interpretation

could not bring the wholesale abolition of laws, the
de-Kaeification procedure, the arrest of thousanis of
individuals, the introduction of ewceping social reforms,
the expropriations of industries, and above all the
sweeping changes in the territorial and constitutional
structure of Germany within the rights of belligerent

11
âee Kelsen, loc. cit.. 513} Georg -cbw&raenberger,
"A ^Canual of Internat lonal Law," 91, 105 (1947) ; Quincy
Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial," 41
12
Kuns,

538.
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•41»
occupation#"

13

Âlwyn Free^an, former Assistant to

the Legal Adviser of the United States Department
of State, examining the legpl character of belligerent
occupation, concludes:
• • « the Hague Regulations. • • are
inapplicable to the situation now prevail
ing in Germany. Disappearance of the
German Gtate as a belligerent entity,
necessarily implied in the Declaration
of Berlin of June 5, 1943, signifies that
a true state of war - hence belligerent
occupation - no longer exists vithin the
meaning of international law. The occupy
ing authorities are exercising and are
entitled to exercise all the attributes
of sovereignty over the area. 14
from the foregoing discussion of belligerent
occupation, one fact seems evident * in Germany,
after the unconditional surrender of her armed forces,
the essential conditions of occuoatio bellies in the
traditional sense were lacking.

In the three

documents of military surrender signed by German mili
tary leaders there appeared the stipulation, "It is
independent of, without prejudice to, and will be
superseded by, any general instrument of surrender
13
W. Friedman, "The Allied Military Government
of Germany," 3
Judicatae 135 (1947)
14
Alwyn V. Freeman, ^bar Crimes by Enemy Wationala
Administering Justice in Occupied Territory," 41
A.l.i.i. 605 (1947).
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*42"»
Imposed by or oa behalf of the United Nations and
applicable to Cermany and the German armed forces as
a whole,**

The June 5* 1945 Declaration, in which

the Allies assumed supreme authority over the German
territory, is the "general in. trument of surrender"
alluded to in the three military surrender documents.
Since the essential conditions of belligerent occupation
were lacking at the end of the wur, it is obvious that
the theory occunatio bellies in regard to Germany is
untenable and thus, must be discarded.
Fiduciary OccupstiQn

The Swiss writer G, Sauser«-Hall, with recent
support by an American jurist, Max Rbeinstein, has
proposed another theory, that of fiduciary occupation,
to describe the status of Germany.

The concept

pictures the occupant as holding the territory in some
fora of trust, for the benefit of the occupied terri
tory,

Hheinstein, diecuasing fiduciary occupation,

declares:

15
.59
(Supp) 169 (19W).
16
Max Rheinstein, "The Legal Status of Occupied
Germany," 47 KjghiKen
Review 29-30 (1948),
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•A3Havlng û99um%â *upr*me authority with
respect to Oersiany, a country having no
government able to epezik for heroelf and
her people, the occupanta ere finding
themaelvos in a fiduciary position • • • •
The fiduciary position of the occupant*
implies, among others, a duty to preserve
the capital assets of the German econo
my, to restore the productive capacity
of the country» to provide for an efficient
and clean administrative machinery, to
preserve Germany*# cultural identity, to
reintegrate the German people into the
economic and cultural world community, and
to prevent diaease and starvation.16
it would seem that a territory under fiduciary occu
pation is thuu in some way similar to a colony.

Sut

Allied pronouncements during and immediately after the
war suggest that in reality the victors were concerned
with safeguarding their own intereuta.

As Kune points

out:
. . . prior to 1945 iieas were advocated,
studies and preparations made, tending
toward the destruction of Oeramny by way
of dismemberment and not merely toward
the disruption of the Nationalist Socia
list regime in Germany. • • • Summer Welles
. . . proposed a partition plan. The United
States Secretary of the Treasury proposed
his llorgenthau Plan, • • • that coupled the
difimemberment of Germany with the proposal
of her complete deindustrialisation and
pasturalization, by making the Ruhr a
pasture for goats. Diumemberment proposals
and the Korgenthau flan, to a certain extent,
were favored by President Rooswvelt who
proposed at the Teheran Conference the
partition of Germany into five autonomous
states. . . . Churchill advocated joining
Bavaria with Austria. An intergovernmental
IS
Kax Rheinstein, "The Legal Gtatus of Occupied
Germany," 47 KichiRan Law Review 29-30 (1948).
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•44»
Comoitftion for the Dismemberment of Germany
waa oet up* 17
True, in the face of much opposition, the:,e plans and
ideas were modified or diamissei, but as Kuns has
noted, "reminiscences of it remain even in the events
18
and the doeumonts of 194)."
These words in the Fotadam
Declaration are pertinent ;
Germany and the Gorman people have begun to atone
for the terrible crimes coa,mitted under the
leadership of those whom in the hour of their
success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed
• • * • In accordance with the Crimea decision
that Germany be compelled to compensate to the
greatest possible extent for the loss and suffer
ing that she has caused to the United Bâtions
and for which German people cannot escape res
ponsibility, thé following agreement on repara
tions was reached, • • 19
Reparation duties were imposed on the German people;
Poland received German territory;
Saar from Germany;

France detached the

and Germany was split up into four

sones of occupation, each under a different Power with
distinct political alms*
Therefore, there can be little doubt that in 1945»
Germany was to be punished, that reoonetiuction of her
economy was not a paramount consideration, and that the

17
^^Xuna, l££* £Ü,, 546-547*
547.
"Report on Tripartite Conference of Berlin," 39
(supp) 247, 251 (1945).
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«•45*
division of Germany into four zones of occupation lü&de
it untenable to re^^rd that occupation as fiduciary in
the face of Allied directives* attitudes and events
prior to Germany's defeat and in the years 194$*19i6.
Intervention
Still another theory on the le&al status of Germany
proposed by Georg A* Zian and embraced by Adolf Arndt
is that of occur?tion of loterventica. This form of
occupation csn be imposed upon a state when it violates
well established principles of the law of nations.

The

government of Nazi Germany, according to this view, had
been Illegal from its inception to its destruction in
194).

Arndt stctna that "Hitler usurped power in Germany

through violence end fraud and • • . his yower was
always illegal and illegitimate, Consequently, there
was never ^

lure a National Gociali&t state or Third

Reich, but only a National Socialist tyranny in the
German state, , « • Hitler came into power through terror
20
and remained in power through terror."
Proponents of
the doctrine of occupation of intervention are of the
opinion that the last war was an international civil war
fought for the rights and privileges of men.

Following

20
Adolf Arndt, "Status and Development of Consti
tutional Law in Germany," 260 The Annals 2-3 (November
1948).
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this lins of thought, th$ Allied nations intervened,
or went to war with an illegal governmentj

and upon

the latter*8 defeat, the victorious powers occupied the
territory by right of intervention.

Somewhat similar

to the position taken by fiduciary occupation, occupation
of intervention implies that the Allies occupied Germany
for the benefit of the country.

As trustees of the

territory and its inhabitants it is their task to re*
construct the political life in that area and to return
the people to a more democratic way of life.
It eppears, however, that the concept of occupation
of intervention is an

foe solution with little basis

in general international Isw.

Lauterpacht-Oppenheis

defines intervention thus;
dictatorial interference by a Jtate in the
affairs of another State for the purpose of
maintaining or altering the actual conditions
of things, buch intervention can take place
by rigfct or without (a) ri#ht,but it always
concerns the external independence of the
territorial or personal supremacy of the
iState concerned, and the whole matter is
therefore of forest Importance for the inter
national position of States. That intervention
is, as a rule, forbidden by the Law of Rations
which protects the international personality
of the States, there is no doubt. 21
It may be conceded that while some of Hitler*s methods
end motives were repulsive to the nations of the world,
he was careful in the year 1933 to avoid unconstitutional
21
Lsuterpacht-Oppenhelm, I Interns>tional Law, 272
(7th 2d. m S ) .
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-47BtQtsures In his ris* to power.

Re bec&m# the leader

by virtue of & constitutional election.

Naturally, his

popularity was not overwhelming among all the Germans
at first, but there seems to be little doubt that in
the years following 1933 the majority of Carmans, after
witnessing Germany's benefits under Nasi domination,
supported Hitler voluntarily,

Koreover, the principal

nations continued to recognise Hitler and his government
as sovereign ^

lure, indicating little or no conviction

that Hitler end his government were illegal,

ThArefors,

occupation of intervention does not seem plausible when
applied to the status of Germany after World War II,
Kuns observes that "the literature has produced many
ad hoc solutions, ouch as an occupation of intervention
.

, But these

hoc solutions are legally untenable,

because they have no basis in general intematicnal law.
Intervention without a particular legal title is un
lawful under general international law."22

A German, Professor Verdross, offers still another
theory as tw the legal position of occupied Germany in
which he reasons that the Four Powers .xerci&e supreme
authority in the higher organs of Oeraan political

Kuns,

539-540,
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•46»
machinery but that Geromn state power has continued to
23
exist in the lower organs*
But legal sovereignty
has cOBBQonly been regarded as indivisible, and it
seems anomalous that sovereignty could exist in the
lower organs in the hands of one sovereign, and at the
same time, exist in the higher organs in the hands of
another sovereign*

This theoretical difficulty is

obviated by specific terms of the Declaration of Berlin.
No German sovereignty has existed in the lower organs
since, by that Declaration, the Allies assumed "supreme
authority with respect to Germany, including all the
powers possessed by the German Government, the High
Command and any state, municipal, or local government
24
or authority/'
Professor Verdross appears to have
made a distinction between territorial sovereignty and
mere territorial supremacy, that is, between sovereignty
and mere exercise of sovereignty.

The Allies, for

Verdross, only exercise sovereignty.

This view of

occupied Gefmany, while theoretically tenable, seems
unsupportable in the face of the Declaration of Berlins

23
Ibid., 559 reporting correspondence with Verdross,
24
39 A.J.i.L. (3upp) 171-172.
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49*

The Government» of the United Kingdom, the
United ütatea of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics» and the
Provisional Government of the French
Republic, will hereafter .etermiae the
boundaries of Germany or any part thereof
and the status of Germany or of any area g.
at present being part of German territory.^'
If the Allies merely exercised sovereignty, but were
not the actual territorial sovereigns, then how are we
to explain the situation in which the Allies decide the
disposition of territory?

Kuns agrees that the distinction

made by Verdross between mere exercise of sovereignty and
actual territorial sovereignty, "is certainly a correct
one."
He who, as in the ease of cession for adminis
tration, has only territorial supremacy is not
the sovereign. He h»a only, . . . all the
rights as if he were sovereign, but not of the
sovereign; the right of sovereignty
. .
can be in another state. Only the sovereign
has the 1ua disponendi over the territory,
not he who has mere territorial supremacy. 26
But this was not the case in Germany.

The Declaration

of Berlin, expressly stated that the Allies, "will
27
hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany."
There
fore, Professor Verdross* theory seems not only un
convincing, but erroneous.

25

172.

Kuns, log, cit.. 5)8-559.
39

(S«pp) m

(1945)
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Of the four theories thus f^r examined none appear
to be tenable#

To reiterate, Ger%a%y#s situation at

the end of the war was unique and unprecedented.
country was conquered byt not annexed;

The

and political

and legal ambiguities crept into the various declarations
and actions of the victors as disunity developed between
28
tho Three -eatern powers and the Joviet Union#
Never
theless, aince it is essential to find some legally
acceptable theory of the status of Ger&aoy, a fifth
theory, known as title bv conquest, will be discussed
38 the moat promising concept#
Bans Kelsen has proposed a title by conquest doctrine
for the status of Germany, maintaining that Germany ceased
to exist as a sovereign state, &n: that har sovereignty
was assumed and exercised by the victorious Pour Powers#
According to Keleen, "The existence of an independent
government is an essential element of a state in tho eyes
of international law, • • • By abolishing the last
Government of Germany the victorious powers have destroyed
the existence of Germany as a sovereign state.

Since

her unconditional surrender, at least since the abolish
ment of the Doenit* Government, Germany has ceased to

2*
Kuns, 2oc. sM,*» 545.
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-51exist as a state, the status of war has been terminated,
because such a status can exist only between belligerent
29
states, .
Lauterpacht-Oppenheia, on the question of government
independence concurs with Kelsen, stating that, *A state
is in existence when a people is settled in a country
30
under its own sovereign Government,**
Kelsen*s thesis,
then, is that Germany was conquered and debellatio
resulted opening the way for sovereignty in a condominium
of the victors ov#r that territory.

In

international

law a condominium is recognised as the joint exercise
31
of sovereignty over some territory by two or more states.
Green Hackworth, legal adviser to the State Department
and American representative to the International Court
of Justice, states*
The conjoint exercise of sovereignty over a
region by two or more states is denominated
condominium. The joint action of Great
Britain and Egypt in ti e Sudan and that of
Great Britain and France in the Kew Hebrides
have been referred to by writers as examples
of condominium. 32
Lauterpacht-Oppenheia regard condominium as the foremost

Lauterpacht-Oppenheia, ££, cit.. 114.
31
Schwarsenberger, on, cit,,(Glossary IXXIX).
32
Green Hackworth, 1 Digest of International Law.
56-57 (1940),
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-52and parhapa aol# exception to the general maxim of the
Indivisibility of a single sovereignty over the same
territory.

"In this case a piece of territory consist

ing of land or water Is under the joint tenancy of two
or more states, these several states exercising sovereignty
conjointly over it, and over the individuals living thereon.*
Thus Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg from
1664 till 1666 were under the condominium of
Austria and Prussia. . , and since 1939 the
Islands of Canton and Sndenburg. . . have
been under the joint control of Great Britain
and the United States. . . . When on June 3,
1943, Great Britain, the United States,
Russia and France, in a Declaration regarding
the defeat of Germany, assumed supreme authority
over that country, they provided an example of
joint exercise of sovereignty. 33
The ideas of Kelsen have gained wide support.
Including some Germans, especially a minority of
experts preparing the Bonn constitution and concurring
with Kelsen*a views that Germany as a sovereign state
34
had ceased to exist.

33
Lauterpacht-Oppenhei®,
cit.. 409, 411.
34
Kuns,
542, 543.
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•53A curiously Interesting case connected indirectly
with the status of Germany was noted recently in the
Hichiran Law Review. An American citizen living in
Germany voted for the election of local officials in
the American Zone of Occupation.

For this act, the

American citizen was issued a certificate of loss of
nationality for having violated the Nationality Act of
1940 restricting Americans from voting in political
elections in a foreign state,

A federal District Court

in Texas held that the petitioner had not lost her
citizenship since the election was held in territory
then ruled and governed by the United Jtates and was held
by permission and under the direction and by the authority
of the United States, and was not an election in a foreign
35
state within the meaning of the Nationality Act of 1940.
Before we evaluate the theory of title by conquest,
attention must be given to the closely related meaning
of debellatio in international law.

There is a deep

divergency in the literature regarding the legal con
notation of debellatio.

W d e m Continental writers on

35

Brehm v. Acheaon, 90 F. Supp. 662 (D. C. Tex.
1950)I noted, 49 Michigan Law Review 631, 6)4 (February
1951)
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the eubject emphasise factual considerations in use
of the term.

That is, if the enemy forces have been

annihilated in fact, if occupation of the enemy state
is total, if the government is destroyed, then the
enemy state has ceased to exist as a sovereign state«
Thus debellatio. for Continental writers, is identical
with conquest.

Annexation is not legally necessary in

36
order to make debellatio complete.

The second school

of thought on the other hand, claims that debellatio
consists of conquest D^us subjugation and that sub
jugation can only be effected through annexation.

Lauter-

pacht-Oppenheim, representative of the Anglo-American
school, denies that conquest alone is able to bring about
subjugation and thus debellatio. "Conquest is only a
mode of acquisition if the conqueror, after having
firmly established the conquest, formally annexes the
territory.

Such annexation makes the enemy State cease

ro exist, and thereby brings the war to an end. . . it
is conquest followed by subjugation, and not conquest
alone, which gives a title, and is a mode of acquiring
37

territory;'

Westlake declaredt

"The extinction of a

state by conquest will take place when the conquering
36

Kuns, 12£. £11., 552.
37

Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, ££. £ll., 518.
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-55power has declared Its will to annex it and has

38
established its authority throughout the territory.. .
Fenwick concurs, declaring that conquest is usually
described as subjugation, but that this should only
occur when conquest is followed by formal annexation
of the defeated territory.

The sovereignty and inter

national personality of the state is destroyed when
there is conquest plus subjugation;

subjugation, of
39

course, entailing formal annexation.
Some additional minor points must be examined.
question might be raised:

The

is debellatio accepted as

legal in the law of nations?

At first glance the answer

would have to be in the negative, for much opposition
to the doctrine has arisen.

Further, it is not denied

that tenddencies have appeared in this century which
have endeavored to place limitations on title by conquest.
These tendencies found expression in numerous Pan-American
40
declarations.
But these tendencies, however admirable,
are not yet a new rule of general international law.
P --------

John Westlake, International Law. 64 (1904).
39
,
Charles Fenwick, International Law. 661 (3rd Ed*
1948).
40
Kuns, loc. cit.. 551.
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•56H/d« concedes that while it would be commendable if
the nations of the world would outlaw this title by
conquest, he is forcad to

Lit, as do others, that

no rule has yet been accepted which legally abolishes
41
conquest as a mode of acquisition of territory.
As Sir John Fisher-Willlams stated:
Conquest is often, though not always, a moral
wrong. But it is not illegal and it produces
legal results. &e shall not advance tha cause
of peace and international order by seeking to
deny that war produces results - such as the
acquisition of territory • which it does in
fact produce. If we want to stop the forcible
acquisition of territory, we mupt stop private
war. 42
Title by conquest, though cofrimon in the day of Grotius,
had almost disappeared by the end of the nineteenth
century.

But there is no evidence that it had been out

lawed by the international community, and it did reappear
in the twentieth century, as evidenced by the conquest
of the Hoer Republics in 1900 by Great Britain, and the
co'^quest of uthiopia by Italy in 1937.

Doubtless, the

41
Hyde, ''Conque&t Today," 30
471, 476 (1936)
42
Sir John Fisher-iilliams, "Sovereignty, Seisin
and the Leüçue," 7 British Yearbook of Interriâtional
Law 41 (192o), hereafter cited
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-57world would benefit by Its outlawry^ but this has not
yet been achieved.

General International law knows of

no rule yet which placo* restrictions on title by
eonqueat, and it appears sound to say that title by
conquest Is still legally valid.
To return now to the matter of the two schools of
doctrine on debellatio: we have seen how the AngloAmerican school insists that title by conquest is only
achieved when the conquering power has effectively
occupied the enemy's tfT'^tory and then formally annexed
it.

Tet| regarding Germany, the Allies in the June 5»

1945 Declaration explicitly declared that it was not
their intention to annex the German territory.

If we

then follow Anglo-American doctrine, the Allies are not
sovereign occupants, for Germany, although conquered,
was certainly not annexed.

The Anglo-American inter

pretation may be too rigidly conceptual.

It seems that

if a state is in a position to annex an enemy's territory,
it coincidentally has the right to impose less harsh
methods.

That is, the conqueror could hold the territory

on a temporary basis.

"Under international law," accord

ing to Wright, "a state may acquire sovereignty of
territory by declaration of annexation after subjugation
of the territory."

However, this American writer goes

on to say that, " . . . it appears that if a state or
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stat«» er« in a position to annex a territory they
have the ri^ht to declare the leaser policy of
exercising sovereignty temporarily for specified purposes
with the intention of eventually transferring the
43
sovereignty to someone else.**
Kuns concurs1
ift’hile the situation. . . could be construed
as healed by the principle of effactivity
that is a norm of positive general inter
national law, it is not necessary to resort
to this construction. The legal basis of the
present occupation is conquest; the con
queror has a riht to annex the conquered
state, but can also take other measures.
He can, particularly, intend to preserve the
80verei;;nty of the conquered state. That
was the d dared intention of the conquerors
of Germany, 44
The literature on methods of acquiring territorial
sovereignty usually recogniyes five modes to attain
45
such ends.
The British writer, K&nn, though not
repudiating the general view that conquest followed
by annexation is the usual procedure, suggests that
this is not the only possibility.

"It must be admitted

that there is no a priori reason why the categories of
methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty should
be considered cloced.

Intern.:tronal law is not so

10,. ,11.. 50.
Kunz, loc. cit.. 564.
Herbert Briggs, The Law of Rations. 182,183 (1933).
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-59rlgld at to exclude new development*.

It may well

be» therefore» titiat there existe a sixth method of
46
acquiring territorial sovereignty. .
In the
words of Kelsent
The existence of a etate is destroyed by
it# adversary when the latter haa not only
annihilated the armed force* but also
abolished the government of the former.
The establishment of territorial sovereign
ty doe* not depend on the new sovereign*#
intention to hold the territory for good. . . .
if there 1# a difference at all between formal
annexation and placing the territory under the
conqueror*» sovereignty without the latter*#
intention to hold it permanently» it is rather
a political than legal one. 47
Schwarsenberger point# out that the Allie# at the end
of World War II could have done any one of three
things,

they could have annexed all or some of the

German territory;

they could regard the German terri

tory as re# nulliusi or they could have established
the German territory aa a new international person»
over which they might exercise a condominium and
ultimately return the territory to the sovereignty of
the German people.

Of the three choices» Schwsr&enberger

46
F, A. Fiann, "the Present Legal Statu# of Germany»**
1 Intiwrmjtiqnal l^w Quarterly 326 U947).
47
Kelsen,
521.
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continues, the

h XIIcs

adopted the
^nd est.biished
48
a condon^lniua over Gerr^^ny,
Cvoa L&uterp&chtOppenhoim, while strictly œainto^ninjr: that title by
conquest 1» acquired after tho ccnv,uered territory
is forxally annexed, makes the concession that con
quered territory, though not annexed, continues to be
49
in possession and under the owcy of the conqueror.
A German philosopher, Jurgen von Keapski, takes a
slightly different view from both schools, regarding
subjugation as a much broader concept than that proposed
by Lauterpacht-Cppenheim and the Anglo-Americcn school
on debellatio. ‘'Ever/ annexation," states Kempski,
"is indeed a subjugation but a subjugation does not
50
have to be an annexation."
Von Kempaki* s view is
close to that of the Continental school;

while this

school accepts title by simple conquest, von Kempski,
admitting title by subjugation, is 'till leas rigid in
his conception.

The British writer Jennings asserts:

48
Gchwarcenbergor, 1
i H . 1^2 (2nd
Sd. 1950).
49
Lauteroacht-Onoenheim. 1 International taw 519
(7th td. 1948).
50 Jurgen von Rempski, "Deutschland Ala Volkerrechts*
problem," 1 Merkur 191-192 (1947).
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•61GtrmfiOf V9.9 so completely at the disposal
of the Allies as to Justify thea in law in
annexing the German state; it would seem
to follow that they are by the same token
entitled to assume the rights of supreme
authority unaccompanied by annexation. 51
Returning to the question which of the two doctrines
of debellatio seems the most plausible, it is obvious
that the traditional Anglo-American view is too rigid
to accomodate Uie facts ih Germany,

n.e Allies were

certainly legally entitled to annex Germany, but this
was not their desire.

:A.ev<kr, it is not very convincing

to say that their failure to aunex invalidates the claim
that they are sovereigns in Germany.

Surely, they were

entitled to take whatever measures they wished once
Germany was totally defeated.

Moreover, the traditional

Anglo-American position is attacked by foremost AngloAmerican writers on international law.

The Continental

doctrine, in general, more closely cover# the facts in
Germany.

For this school, an enemy state is totally

defeated and conquered and the conqueror, aa the
sovereign over the territory, pursues whatever measures
he deems fit.

Further, the Continental school appears

more humanitarian in that it does not require that
annexation must follow.

Thus the Continental school

most nearly accommodates the unprecedented situation
51
H. T. Jennings, "Government in Commission,"
23 l.I.i.L. 137 (1946).
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-62in Oermany in 1945 to the more orthodox le^al channels
of international law*
Still another group of writers concur in the
thesis that C&rsi&ny baa ceased to exist, but do not
touch upon the divergent view on debellatio. These
writers assume that Germany has ceased to exist,
simply by virtue of her unconditional surrender end
the Berlin Declaration.

Finch states:

With the unconditional surrender of Germany,
its government went out of existence as a
sovereign state and its sovereignty is now
held in trust by the condominium of the oc
cupying powers, 52
The American Jurist Karl Loewenatein has written:
By the Four Power Statement of June 5, 1945#
the Inter-Allied Control Authority, Control
Council, was established in Borlin ae the
supreme authority for occupied Germany in
lieu of the non-exieting central Geman
government, 53
Kheinstein agrees with Finch and Loewenatein:

52
George A, Finch, **The Nuremberg Trial and
International Law," 41 A.J.l.L, 22 (1947).
53
Karl Loewenatein, "Law and Legislative Process
in Occupied Germany," 57 Tale Low Journal 725 (194746),
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R« who ha# ««suotad all th# powara of th#
Geraan govammant 1@ tha German goTernmeat.
Rene#, there exifita a German government and
thla government resta with the four occupylog Power#• 54
To recapitulate, five different thooriea on the
status of Germany have been examined:
occupation;
intervention;

fiduciary occupation;
dual sovereignty;

belli&erent

occupation of
and title by conquest,

or debellatio. Of the five, the last, title by conquest
a# understood by the Continental writers, appears to
be the most tenable.
It has been nuceaaary bore to establish Germany's
status St the end of World Uur II for two reasons.
First, the very fact th«;t the Allies became sovereign
on Ge%%sn territory may be found to affect the basis
of Jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

Jecond, in view of

Allied sovereignty in Germany, ccnaent from Germany
was not an indispensable condition for legal validity
in the trial of her war criminals.

54
Sheinstein, loc. cit.. 25.
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CHAFTEn III
XKTEa?r..;TATlCa Cf THE JURISDICTION

CP THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY

TaiSUNAL
Critics of the Kureabcrg Trial, with firm and
perhaps sincere conviction, challenged the ri#it of
victorious nations to prosecute and convict individuals
who were moBbers of a v n^uished state without the
consent of that state.

The challenge was based on the

well established rule of general intemotional law
denying a state jurisdiction over acts of another
state and its nationals without consent of that state.
Quincy kright notes that "Sovereign states. # . cannot
be subjected to foreign jurisdiction without their
consent."

Kelsen declares;

The principle that no state has jurisdiction
over acta of another state applies also to
the jurisdiction of a tribunal established
by an international agreement with respect
to acts of a state not a contracting party
to the agreement. 2

1
Quincy Wright, "Law of the Nuremberg Trial,"
U A.i.i.JL. 46 (1947).
Hans Kelsen, Princioles of International Law.
230(1952).

•64»
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"The jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals,"
according to -chwsrzenberger, "depends on the consent
of the parties concerned,"
4
concur in this view.

A niuiber of other writers

The Allies, at the torain^tion of world v;ar I,
observed the rule that & state h^s jurisdiction over
acts of another st%te onl/ with the latter*s consent.
Certain Articles, {22Ô, 229 and 230) were inserted in
the Treaty of Versailles and ca^e to be regarded as
the punitive Articles, The Versailles Treaty, establish
ing criminal responsibility of the German O^peror and
others for violation^ of internutiinal law committed
in their capacity as agents of the German deich, was
Hîtified by Germany,

It is evident however, that the

situation at the end of aorld iar II was essentially
different.

As we have seen, there ia a tenable argument

to be made that, in the a^noe of international law,
Germany had ceased to exist.
The four Powers exercising condominium over Germany
thus could htve created a municipal court competent
to try Carman major war criminals.
was not followed.

But this procedure

Instead, these Powers met

London

3
Georg Gchwarzenbe: ger, A Manual of In ..ematianal
Law. 238 (1952).
4
Philip C, Jesau';, "Co:apet«nce of Courts in negard
to Foreign Gtates," 26
456 (Supp 1932)/Charles
Fenwick, International Law. 3Ü9, 309 (3rd Ed, 1948).
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Augudt d, 1945 and signed an agreement for the
establishment of an international military tribunal
for the trial of all European Axis major war criminals*
It must be emphasised, nevertheless, that allied
soverei^t/ in Germany waa important, for if Germany
had not ceased to exist, then the oignatorias to the
Agreement needed her consent*
It may be tenable to assume that the London Agreement
was the international basis for the Tribunal for various
reasons.

Fir.t, the Tribunal was the offspring of an

international treaty and derived its creation and
jurisdiction from such a treaty in the same manner as
any other international court, comission or board*
Second, the adherence of nineteen other members of the
United Nations to the principles of the Agreement lent
some persuasiveness to the contention that the Tribunal
was international.

Third, though it is conceded that

the Agreement created an agency for the application
of traditional international law when the Tribunal was
empowered to try traditional war crimes, it went beyond
this and established conventional law by commissioning
the Tribunal to try individuals on charges of crimes
against humanity*
It may also be tenable to say that the London
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-67Agmeæent, though formally establishing an international
tribunal, was In substance actually creating a Jointnational tribunal.

Uo doubt exists that such a tribunal

would have had Jurisdiction to try Individuals for
traditional war crimes by resorting to principles of
general international law.

By analogy, the Judicial

organs of any nation may punish pirutea for having
committed acta In violation of the laws of nations.
But the Nuremberg Tribunal did not stay within the scope
of traditional war crimes, for It prosecuted and punished
also those persons guilty of having co^wiltted crimes

5

Kelsen, £ d . cit.. 124-125; Cut whereas according
to international law the criminal Jurisdiction of
municipal law la ordinarily restricted to crimis com
mitted on Its terra firua or territorial waters or Its
own ships, and to crimes b Its own nationals wherever
committed. It is also recognized «s extending to piracy
committed on the high seas by any national on any ship,
because a person guilty of such piracy has placed him
self beyond the protection of any ütate. In iCe Mracy
Jure Gentium, Great Britain; Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, (1934), reprinted ^.n Brings, The law
of Nations, 361, 263 (1938).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"68—

against humanity, as defined in the Charter ann^xud to
the Agreement.

If it is maintained that it was a joint-

national tribunal & difficulty ari es, because it would
then appear to be a national tribunal applying ^
treaty l&w and an £d hoc tribunal applying;

hoe

hoe law,

Schwarsenberger miikes this point, that "the status of
the Tribunal within the judicial hisrarchy of municipal
courts and tribunals of the states which shared it was

6
that of a military £d hoe tribunal."

however, if the

words of the international Military Tribunal sumraoning
allied sovereignty for support in its resort to muni
cipal law are accepted at face value, the ed hoc
objection may perhaps be circumvented.

The Tribunal

declared that "The making of the Charter was the exercise
of the sovereign legislative power b* the countries to
7
which the German %eich unconditiunall/ surrendered, .
To give additional strength to the contention that

6
dch«arzonberg»r, 1 Intfn’ndtional Law. )14 (2nd
Hd. Iv49).
7
Oninion and JudrTn?nt. 48.
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.69the Power* intended to create &erely a joxnt-iational
tribunal, Article 1 of the London /^greeæent may be
quoted :
There shall be established after consultation
with the Control Council for Geraany an Inter
national Military Tribunal for the trial of
war cri&^nals -hose offenses have no parti
cular geographical location whether they be
accused individual!/ or in their capacity am
meœbers of organizations or groupa or in
both capacities. 6
From this Article one might argue that if the Tribunal
was internatiowal, with the power to try all nxia major
criminals there was no need to consult the Control
Council for Germany on the establishment of an inter
national court.

Further, in Article 29 of the Charter

annexed to the Agreement there is the provision that
the sentences to be imposed upon those found guilty
should be carried out in accordance with the orders
of the Control Council for Germany;

and the power to

reduce or alter the sentences is, according to this
Article, within the domain of the Control Council.
Moreover, on December 20, 194$, Control Council Law
Ko. 10 was en*i>cted.

This Law, enacted more t^an a

month after the Tribunal commenced its work, declared
that:

a
Robert H. Jackson, The Cape Ag-ainst the Nazi
Criminals. 96 (1946).
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or

—7 0 —

In order to /Iva effect to the terms of the
Koscow Ooclarutxon of 30 Octobsr 1943 and the
London Agreeaient of 8 August 1945* end the
Charter pursuant thereto and in order to
establish a unii'ons legal basis in Oenaany
for the prosecution of war criminals and
other SiBular offenders, other than those
dealt with by the intern.-vtic>nal military
Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows
. . . The Moscow Declaration of 30 uctober
1943. . . and the London Agreement of 8 October
1945 ^Concerning the Prosecution and Punishment
of Major i.ar Criminals of the European Axis’*
are snde integral parts of this law. 9
Thus Law 10 besides creating a uniform le^ul b.sia for
the prosecution of war criminals other than those to
be dealt with by the International Military Tribunal,
declared that it ?.>ve effect, thon.-^h belatedly, to the
London A,^re@ment and Charter and made both of them
Intei^ral parts of the Law,

It has been argued that

Law 10, by using the words "to give effect," and "are
made integral parts of this Low," sought to give
legislative authority to the wonion A^'reeaisnt.
Cchick, Professor of Political

Cience

Prana

at the Univerisity

of Utah has st&teds

nation 358 (April 1949)» emphasis added.

i Concl
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-71It la, therefore. Control Council Law No. 10,
and not the London A^ireeaient, which r„uot be
considered tho legal t.sia for the Nuremberg
trial. Ko doubt exists that the Control Council
at Berlin was competent to proclaim such a law
since the Allied Powers, on the basis of the
Potadam Declaration, h«d assumed supreme
autrorit/ with respect to Germany, including
all the powers possessed by the German Govern
ment, the High Command and any Gtate, municipal,
or local government or authority, and since,
according to a declaration issued on the same
day, this supreme authority over Germany was
to be exercised, on instructions from their
Governments, by the Govict, British, United
Btates, and French Commanders-in-Chief, each
in his own zone of occupât! n, and also jointly,
in matters affecting Germany as a whole. . . .
Control Council Law No. 10, succeeded belatedly
in establishing the legal basis for the pro?^
secution of German major war criminals. . .1^
Prom this it might be implied that the jurisdiction of
the International Fiilitary Tribunal had been delegated
to it by the Control Council as the body exercising
supreme authority in Germany.

Thus it would follow

that in substance the Nuremberg Tribunal was of a
joint-nat*onal character.
But the assumption that Control Council Law 10
gave a legal be sis to the Tribunal must be disidssed.
The Charter for the Kurcmbsrg Tribunal annexed to the
London Agreement provided for the trial of all major
war criminals of the European Axis.

Here lies the

10
Frans jchick, "Xntîfrnational Criminal Law - Facts
and Illusions," 11 The Kodern Lew A?view 297-^;S (1948).
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inconsistency,

How could the Tribunal, if it

received its powers from Control Council Law No, 10,
exercise authority broader than that of the Control
Council for Germany by stating that it would prosecute
all major European Axis war criminals, while the
Control Council had legislative power only over the
German territory?
There is no doubt that statements in the Tribunal* s
Judgment, in Article 1 of the London Agreement and in
Article 29 of the Charter contained ambiguities.
Perhaps the chief reason for this was that the four
sovereign nations in Germany and signatories to the
Agreement were somewhat uncertain in when creating
such a novel experiment as the Tribunal, and that this
confusion led to ambiguity of official languate.

Or it

might be argued that the four Powers were not satisfied
that the London Agreement by itself could vest
jurisdiction in the International Military Tribunal,
and sought a firmer basis, notably, Allied supreme
authority in Germany,
However, Schwarzenberger presents a seemingly
formidable argument that the Tribunal had a dual
source of jurisdiction and was joint-national in
substance.

In the view of this jurist, the duality of

jurisdiction rests upon the London Agreement and Allied
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-73sovereignty In Cerscanyj
The international b&ol* of the fcuremborg
Tribunal was provided by the Agreement of
August 6* 1965,. • • • There was, however,
another source of the Tribunal*« jurisdiction:
the exercise by the occu//in^ Powers of
condominium over Germany. 11
It may be argued against vchwarrenberger*s contention
that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
stipulated that ail major war criminals of the European
Axis, not merely Germany, would be tried.

It is con

ceded that in practice only Germans were prosecuted
and punished by the Nuremberg Tribunal, but it was the
declared intention of the Jignatories to try all
European Axis criminals,

if the Allies had specifi

cally stated that they wo:ld bring only German major
war criminals before thQ International Military Tribunal,
th-n it would be reasonable to say that the Tribunal
had a dual source of jurisdiction;

in fact, the

London Agreement would not even have been necesa&ry.
The Control Council for Germany exercising condominium
over the territory could legally liave established a
court for the prosecution of the alleced German criminals.
On the ffiStter of the joint-national ch;*ructer of
the Tribunal ^chwarzenbergsr states*

n ---------

ochwarî©nbery;er, 1 international Law. 314 (2nd
Ed. 1950).
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•74• • • th« Nuremberg Tribunal may claim to
be international in the formal aense of
the word. . . # It derivea its existence
and Jurisdiction from an international
treaty. . . . It appears, however, to have
been the intention of the parties to establish
in substance Joint military tribunals under
municipal law rather than a truly international
tribunal. 12
He aupporta this view by reference to two facts.

First,

a declaration by the Tribunal states that the Signatory
Powers created the Tribunal and, "In doing so they have
13
done together vrhat any of them might have done singly."
Secondly, Justice Jackson stated that "One of the reasons
this Tribunal

was constituted as a military tribunal

instead of an ordinary court of law was to avoid the
precedent-creating effect of what is done here on our
own law and the precedent control which would exist
14
if this were an ordinary judicial body."
In making the first point that the Tribunal was a
joint national tribunal in substance, ^chwarsenbar^er
overlooks an important matter.

It is conceded that a

single nation has the power to try enemy wa. criminals
who have committed crimes against this nation once they

12

iMl-f 311.
Opinion and Judgment. 48.
14
3chwar%enberger, £2*

313, quoting Justice

Jackson.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-75are within its power.

However, a single nation could

not try individuals for hovicg committed crimes af^axnst
15
other states.
Yet, this is exactly what the
Nuremberg Tribunal was doing.

Great Britain, irance,

Russia and the United States were prosecuting enemy
war criminals who not only committed crimes aga&nst
them but against many other nations.
On the a-cond point ^cwarsenberjer, analysing
Jackson's statement that the Tribunal **was constituted
as a military tribunal. . . to avoid the precedent16
creating effect. • ."
concludes that the Tribunal
was a joint-national tribunal for if it had been truly
iDLern&tional, it did not require the title of military,
since international tribunals do not create precedents.
It does not follow, however, that making the Tribunal
military m^vde it joint-national.

.»ar criminals are

usually tried before military cours.

It seems quite

as reasonable to argue that Jackson's words were merely
precautionary agsinot setting precedents, as it is to
argue 3chwar%enb%rger's view, that imposing the title
of military ujon the tribunal mude it joint-national
in substance,

^chwarzenber&er, perhaps unintentionally,

15
Piracy ie an exception.

Keltjen,

cit.. 124-125.

16
Ochwarzenberger,
Jackson.

clt.. 312, quoting Justice
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-76
supported the contention that celling the Nuremberg
Tribunal military does not necessarily myke it jointnational when he stated that *Under international
customary Ikw persons accused of war crimes are entitled
to trial by a military court of the eneay.

To this

extent the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal is merely
declaratory of international customary law.

By appoint

ing a Major-General Jurisprudence as a member of the
Tribunal and a Lieutenant-Colonel as his alternate, the
Soviet Union emphasised the traditional character of
17
such proceedings."
It is not denied that here
Schwarzenbergsr is speaking of national or jointnational tribunals, but it must be remembered that the
International Tribunal at Nuremberg vas also trying
enemy war criminals and therefore, was justified in
having the title of military.
Before conclusions can be reached as to the source
of jurisdiction of the Tribunal and its character, a
further argument must be presented.

Counsel for defense

of the twenty-four accused criminals challenged the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the grounds that the

17
Ibid.. 310.
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-77th» Tribunal was iad« up of members of the victcrijua
Powers and that neither Germany nor neutral states
18
were represented.
We might dismiss this view on
the /round of the stimulation in Article 3 of the
Charter that ’’Neither the Tribunal, its members nor
their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution,
19
or by the refendants or their Counsel,”
However it
seems proper to point out that much could be said in
support of the view that neutrals should have been
represented on the Tribunal.

But this was not legally

necessary and the I'efensc had little basis for its
challenge on this point,

Üoreovcr, there were few

neutrals at the termination of horld I'^ar 11.

Gn the

matter of Germans baing represented, this too was not
legally necessf»ry.

Germany had ceased to oxist.

is conceded, however, that it

It

have been more

satisfactory as far as German sentiment was concerned
if one of their compatriots i/ere present, but the fact
that this was not the casa does not detract anything
from the jurisdiction of the Court,

As ^chwar&enberger

stated:

18

Karl Corsniroc/. (I'upp ÎJ) 1, 3.
19
International Ccnf*?rt^nce on i.ilite-rv Trxcls. 422,
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.78"
. . . the provision in the Charter that
neither the Tribunal nor its members can
be challenged is compatible with the
minimum standards lAiich, under international
customary law, persons accused of war crimes
. . . may expect to be observed towards them.
Kor have persons accused of war crimes any
claim to be judged by nationals of neutral
countries or to have one of their co-nationala
on the bench. . • 20
Some of the problems need restatement.

To say

that the intention of the Allies was to create in
substance a joint-national tribunal seems plausible
for much of the afore-mentioned points in favor of such
a view.

However, it is more tenable to say that the

Nuremberg Court derived its jurisdiction from the
London Agreement and that the Tribunal was one of truly
international character.

The reasons for this con

tention have already been given.

Further support can

be drawn from the ease with which the Signatories
amalgamated rules of evidence and procedure.

If the

Tribunal was contemplated as a joint-national court,
there would have been less readiness to abandon parti
cular national principles of evidence and procedure.
As Wright notes, *. , . it has never been contended
that those rules of evidence are required by inter21
national law,"
Moreover, crimes purported against
20
Schwarzenberger, 0£. cit.. 312.
^\uincy Wright, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,"
41 A.J.I.L. p. 53 (1947).
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•79intern&tional l*w are violations of b^aio interests
protected by the law of nations.

Thus» according to

Wright, the/ "may not be adequately punished by the
exercise of the normal criminal jurisdiction of any
state. • • • International law has recognised the
competence of states to establish international tri
bunals for the trial of grave offenses not dealt with
22

by national tribunals such as terrorism and Aggression.**
Notwithstanding the London Agreement as a source
of jurisdiction for the Nuremberg Court, it seems that
the Tribunal did go beyond this to uvoke a second source
of jurisdiction - general principles of international
law - when it declaredt
It was submitted that international law is
concerned with the actions of sovereign
States, and provides no punishment for in
dividuals; and further, thut where the act
in question is an act of state, those who
carry it out are not personally responsible,
but are protected by the doctrine of the
sovereignty of 3tate. In the opinion of the
Tribunal, both thesw submissions must be
rejected. That international law imposes
duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon dt&tes has long been recognised
• • * • The principle of international law,
which under certain circumstances, protects
the representatives of a state, cannot be
applied to acts which are condemned as
criminal by international law. 23

22

Opinion ajî^ Judgment. 4Ô, 33.

23

Opinion and Judgment. 32, 53*
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From this etatemant we see that the Tribunal was of
the opinion that individuals and not abstract entities
commit crimes which violate international norms, and
when such persons are punished, then the law of n^^tions
la being enforced.

Since a large amount of Justice

Jackson's views were eaioodied an the Judjjicnt by the
Tribunal, one of his passages may be noted in which he
speaks of internationally accepted standards of just
conduct &ni seems to s u :geot emergent positive law:
Those acts which offended the conscience of
our people were criminal by standards generally
accepted in all civilised countries, and I
believe that we may proceed to punish those
responsible in full accord with both our own
traditions of fairness and with standards
of just conduct which have teen internationally
accepted. . . . in troubled times, progress
toward an effective rule of law in the
international community is alow indeed.
Xntertia re.sts more heavily upon the society
of nations than upon any othwr society, how
we st'ïDd at one of those rare moments when the
thourht and institutions and habits of the
world have been shaken by the impact of world
war on the lives of countless million, uuch
occasions rarely come and ^uickly pass, ie
are put under a heavy responsibility to lee
that our behavior during this unsettled period
will direct the world's thoug't t toward a
firmer enforcement of the laws of international
conduct, so as to make war le:s attractive
to those who have governments and destinies
of peoples in their power. 24
24
Opinion and Judgment. )2,

.
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Quite obviouaXy and naturally the Allies were
dedicated to the prosecution of those men who prior
to and during the war had committed acts repulsive
to mankind*

But their punishments were to le applied

through legal norms*

for this reason the Tribunal

wanted a sound legal busis for its jurisdiction.

It

ie the contention of this study that the le^aX basis
was to be found in an international treaty - the
London Agreement.

But it also appears that the

Tribunal appealed to the body of general principles
of international law as a more general basis of
Jurisdiction*

"Thus," concedes Briggs,

* . * the

resort to general principles of law is an accepted
judicial procedure which • • * may, in effect, extend

25
the scope or content of international law,®
The Tribunal's reliance open general principles
of the lew of nations as a second source of jurisdiction
may have juatificution, for in the lumbdiate circums
tances it was difficult for the Tribunal to rest its
basis entirely on strict legal amxims in view of the
dynamic character of the society of nations*

Jackson

eloquently touched upon the central question when
he said;

25
ijriggs. The Law of Nations. 21 (2nd od* 1952).
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•Ô2*“
It is true, of course, that we have no
judicial precedent for the Charter, But
International Law is more than a scholarly
collection of abstract and immutable
principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties
and agreements between nations and of accep
ted custom, let every custom has its origin
in soma single act, and every agreement has
to be initiated by the action of some state.
Unless we are prepared to abandon every
principle of growth for International Law,
we cannot deny that our day has the right
to institute customs and to conclude agree
ments that will themselves become sources of
a newer and strengthened International Law,
International Law is not capable of develop
ment by the normal process of legislation
for there is no continuing international
legislative authority. Innovations and
revisions in International Law are brought
about by the action of governments designed
to meet change in circumstances, 26

26

International Conference on Military Trials.
51-52.
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CKÂHTSa oy THii INTJ&NATiCNAL ^ULITA.iT T^iBUKAL

!•

Constitution of the International Military Tribunal.

Artiela 1.

In pursuance of the Agreement aitned on the

Sth day of Aujruat 1945 by the Government of the United
States of America, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, the Government of the United KlOf^dom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Govern
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there
shall be established an Intern,tional Military Tribunal
(hereinafter called "the Tribunal") for the Just and
prompt trial and punishment of the &ajor war criminals
of the European Axle.
Article 2.

The Tribunal shall consist of four members,

each with an alternate.

One member and one alternate

shall be appointed by each of the Signatories.

The alter*

nates shall, so far as they are able, be present at all
sessions of the Tribunal,

in case of illness of any

member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other
reason to fulfill his functions, his alternate shall
take his place.
Article 3.

Neither the Tribunal, ita members nor their
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•fis*
alternâtos can be challenged by the prosacutJion, or by
the Defendants or their Counsel,

i-ach ui^natory aay

replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate for
reasons of health or for other rood reasons, except
that no replacement may take place during a Trial,
other than by an alternate.
Article i.
(a)

The pr: ence of all four members of the Tri

bunal or the alternate for any absent member shall be
necessary to constitute the quorum.
(b)

The members of the Tribunal shall, before

any trial begins, .^ree aaicn<s themselves upon the
selection from their number of a President, and the
President shall hold office during that trial, or aa
may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three
members.

The principle of rotation of presidency for

successive trials is agreed.

If, however, a session of

the Tribunal takes plüce on the territory of one of the
four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory
on the Tribunal shall preside.
{e)

Gave as afores*id the Tribunal shall take

decisions by a majority vote and in case the votes
are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be
decisive!

provided always that convictions and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8entenc«ô mhall only be imposed by ôffiirnative votes
of at least three members of the Tribunal*
Article 5«

In case of need ijnJ depending on the number

of the Clatters to be tried, other Tribunals may te set
upj

and the establishment, 1'unctions, and procedure

of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall be
governed by this Charter*
11*
Article 6*

Juristiction and General Principles
The Tribunal ^stabliGked ty the Agreement

referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European
Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish
persons who, acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of
oriranixations, committed any of the following; crimes*
The following acts, or any of theu, are crimes
coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for
which there shall be individual responsibility;
(a)

Crimes A^aln't Peace; namely, planning,

preparation, initiation or waging of a war of arpression
or a war in violation of international treaties, agree
ments or assurances, or participation in a common plan
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or conapirac/ for the accompllshmant of any of tha
foregoing;
(b)

>-.ar Crimea: namely, violations of the laws

or customs of war,

Cuch violations shall include, but

not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c)

Crimea Against Humanity: namely, murder,

extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acta comriitted against any civilian population,
before or during the '^ar; or persécutions on political,
racial or religious grounds inexécution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices
participating in Uie formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the fore
going crimes are responsible for all acts performed by
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#ny person* in execution of such plan.
Article 7,

The official position of defendants, whether

a* Heads of 5tate or responsible officials in Government
Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.
Article B.

The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant

to order of his Government or of a superior ^all not
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine that
justice so require*.
Article 9*

At the trial of any individual member of

any group or organisation the Tribunal may declare (in
connection with any act of which the individual may be
convicted) that the group or organisation of which the
individual was a member was a crieou-nal organisation.
After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall
give such notice as it think* fit that the prosecution
intend* to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration
and any member of the organisation will be entitled to
apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tri
bunal upon the question of the crimxnal character of the
organisation.

The Tribunal shall have power to allow or

reject the application.

If the application is allowed,

the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants
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shall ha represented and heard*
Articla 10.

In caaaa wham & group or organization is

declared criminal b/ the Tribunal, tha co&petant
national autorit/ of any Signatory shall have tha ri^ht
to bring individuals to trial for membership therein
before national, military or occupation courts*

In any

such case the criminal nature of the group or organisation
is considered proved and shall not be questioned.
Article 11.

Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be

charged before a natxonal, military or occupation court,
referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime
other than of membership in a criminal group or organi
sation and such court may, after convicting him, impose
upon him punishment independent of and additional to the
punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in
the criminal a ctivities of such group or organisation.
Article 12.

The Tribunal shall have the right to take

proceedings against a person charged with crimes set
out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he
has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason,
finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to
conduct the hearing in his absence.
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Articlt 13.
procedure*

•90»
Th# Tribunal ohall draw up rules for its
These rules shall not be inconsistent with

the provisions of this Charter*

111*

Committee for the investigation and Prosecution of
Kajor *&r Criminals

Article 14*

hach Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecu

tor for the investigation of the charges bgalnst and the
prosecution of major war criminals.
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for
the following purposes:
(a)

to agree upon a plan of the individual work

of each of the Chief Prosecutors and his staff*
(b)

to settle the final designation of major war

criminals to be tried by the Tribunal*
(e)

to approve the Indictment and the documents

to be submitted therewith*
(d)

to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying

documents with the Tribunal*
(e)

to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for

its approval draft rules of procedure* contemplated by
Article 13 of this Charter*

The Tribunal shall have

power to accept* with or without amendments* or to
reject* the rules so recommended*
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-91"
Th# Comilttf# shall act in all the :tove matters
by a majority vote and shall appoint a Chairman as
loay be convenient and in accordance with th# principle
of rotation:

provided that if there is an equal

division of vote concerning the designation of a
Defendant to be tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes
with which he shall be charged, that proposal will be
adopted which was made by the party which proposed
that the particular Defendant be tried, or the parti
cular charges be preferred bgainat him.
Article 15*

The Chief Fros^cutors shall individually,

and acting in collaboration with one another, also
undertake the following duties:
(a)

investigation, collection and production

before or at the Trial of all necessary evidence,
{b}

the preparation of the Indictment for

approval by the Committee in accordance with paragraph
(c) of Article 14 hereof,
(c)

the preliminary examination of all necessary

witnesses and of the Defendants,
(d)

to act as prosecutor at the Trial,

(e)

to appoint repre'tentatives to carry out

such duties as may be assigned to them.
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-92(f)

to unjortake such other mutter* as may

appear necessary to them for the purposes of th#
preparation for and conduct of the Trial.
It is understood that no witness or Defendant
detained by any dlgnatory shall be taken out of the
possession of that Signatory without its assent.

IV.

Fair Trial for Defendants

Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial for the
Defendants, the following procedure shall be followed:
(a)

The Indictment shall include full parti

culars specifying in detail the charges against the
Defendants.

A copy of the Indictment and of all the

documents lodged with the indictment, translated
into a language which he understands, shall be furnished
to the Defendant at a reasonable time before the Trial.
(b)

During any preliminary examination or trial

of a Defendant he shall have the ri&ht to give any
explanation relevant to the charges made against him.
(o)

A preliminary examination o. a Defendant

and his Trial shall be conducted in, or translated
into, a lan.]ua30 which the Defendant understands.
(d)

À defendant shall have tha right to conduct

his own defense before the Tribunal or to have the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-93&8#l3tonoe of Counsol*
(#)

A defendant ahaII have the rl;:ht through

himself or throu^ his Counsel to present evidence
At the Trial in support of his defense, and to
cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution*
V*

Powers of the Tribunal and Conduct of the Trial

Article 17.
(a)

The Tribunal shall have the power

to summon witnesses to the Trial and to

require their attendance and testimony and to put
questions to them,
(b)

to interrogate any Defendant,

(o)

to require the production of documents and

other evidentiary material,
(d)

to administer oaths to witnesses,

(e)

to appoint officers for the carrying out of

any task designated by the Tribunal including tlie
power to have evidence taken on commission*
Article Id*
(a)

The Tribunal shall

confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious

hearing of the issues raised by the charges.
(b)

take strict measures to prevent any action

which will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out
irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever,
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(c)

leal auomrlly with any contumacy, imposing

appropriate punishment, inclulin^ exclusion of any
Defendant or his Counsel from some or all further
proceedings, but without prejudice to tha determi
nation of the charges*
Article 19.

The tribunal s**hdll not be bound by techni

cal rules of evidence*

it shall adopt and apply to

the gre&teot possible extent expeditious and non
technical procedure, and shall udmit any cviiunce
which it deems to have probative v^lue*
Article 20.

The Tribunal may require to be informed of

the nature of any evidence before it is offered so that
it may rule upon the relevance thereof.
Article 21.

The Tribunal shall not require proof of

facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial
notice thereof.

It shall also take judicial notice of

official ,ovcrnmental documents and reports of the
United Nations, including the acts and documents of the
coELsittees set up in the various allied countries for
the investigation of war crimes, and the records and
findings of military or other Tribunals of any of the
United Katione.
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The permanent aeat of the Tribunal shall

be in Berlin*

The first moetings of the membera of

the Tribunal and of the Chief Froeecutore shall be
held at Berlin in a place to be deaignated by the
Control Council for Germany.

The first trial shall

be held at Kurnberg, and any aubae^uent trial* ohall
be held at such places as the Tribunal may decide.
Article 23.

One or more of the Chief Fros^cutors may

tuko part in the prosecution at each Trial.

The

function of any Chief Prosecutor may be discharged
by him personally, or by any person or persons
authorised by him.
The function of Counsel for a Defendant may be
discharged at the Defendant's request by any Counsel
professionally qualified to conduct cases before the
Courts of his own country, or by any other person who
may be specially authorised thereto by the Tribunal.
Article 24.

The proceedings at the Trial shall take

the following course*
(a)

The Indictment shall be read in court.

(b)

The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether

he pleads "guilty** or "not guilty."
(c)

The prosecution shall make an opening state

ment.
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Th# Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and

the defense what evidence (if any) they wish to aubruit
to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the
admissibility of any such evidence.
(e)

Tha witnesses for the Prosecution shall be

examined and after that the witnesses for the Zefanae.
Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may be held by
the Tribunal to be admssible shall be called by
either the Prosecution or the Defense.
(f)

The Tribunal may put any question to any

witness and to any Defendant, at any time.
(g)

The Pros cution and the Defenae shall

interrogate end may cross-examine any witnesses and
any Defendant who gives tt-atimony.
(h}

The Defense shall address the court.

(i)

The Prosecution shall address the court.

(j)

hach Defendant may make a statement to the

Tribunal.
4k)

The Tribunal sbtall deliver judgment and

pronounce sentence.
Article 25.

All official documents shall be produced,

and all court proceedings conducted, in iZnrlish, French,
and Russian, and in the language of the Defendant.

6o

much of the record and of the proceedings nay also be
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-97tranalated Into the language of any country in which
the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers
desirable in the interests of justice and public
opinion.
71.
Article 26.

Judgment and Sentence

The judgment of the Tribunal as to the

guilt or the innocence of any Defendant shall give the
reasons on Wiich it is baaed, and shall be final and
not subject to review.
Article 27.

The Tribunal shall have the ri-ht to

impose upon a Defendant on conviction, death or such
other punishment as shall be determined by it to be
just.
Article 26.

In addition to any punishment imposed by

it, the Tribunal shall have the right to deprive the
convicted person of any stolen property and order its
delivery to the Control Council for Germany.
Article 29*

In case of guilt, sentences shall be

carried out in accordance with the orders of the
Control Council for Germany, which %ay at any time
reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not
increase the severity thereof.

If the Control Council
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for Germany, after any Defendant haa been convicted and
sentenced, diücovers fresh evidence which, in its
opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the
Council shall report accordingly to the Committee
established under Article 14 hereof, for such action
as they may consider proper, having regard to the
interests of justice,
711,

Article 30.

iixponsea

The expens s of the Tribunal and of the

Trials, shall be charged by the Signatories against
the funds allotted for maintenance of the Control Council
for Germany,
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